Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.

Issue: Whether § 230(c)(1) bars a Title II Civil Rights Act claim against Facebook for blocking access to a Sikh advocacy group's Facebook page in India, allegedly at the request of the Indian government.

Sikhs for Justice, a New York nonprofit, operated a Facebook page at www.facebook.com/sikhsforjusticepage to advocate for human rights of Sikhs in India's Punjab region and to promote a self-determination referendum. On or about May 1, 2015, Facebook blocked access to the page in India without prior notice or explanation. SFJ alleged the block occurred "on its own or on the behest of the Government of India" because of discrimination based on race, religion, ancestry, and national origin. SFJ sued Facebook, asserting claims under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, and breach of contract. Judge Koh dismissed the Title II federal claim with prejudice on § 230 grounds. She applied the standard three-part test: Facebook was an interactive computer service; the SFJ Page was information provided by SFJ — a third-party content provider; and Facebook's decision to block the page in India was a publisher decision — specifically, a decision about "whether to publish" third-party content. Under Barnes v. Yahoo!, any activity that amounts to deciding whether to publish or withhold third-party content is a publisher function immunized by § 230(c)(1). The state law claims were dismissed without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an unpublished decision.

Applied § 230(c)(1) to bar a federal civil rights challenge to a platform's content removal decision, even where the removal allegedly occurred at the behest of a foreign government and was motivated by discriminatory animus. The case established that § 230's publisher immunity applies to a platform's decision to block or restrict access to third-party content regardless of the reason for that decision — including allegations of politically or discriminatorily motivated moderation. Frequently cited in debates over whether § 230 should be conditioned on neutral content moderation.