Riddle v. X Corp

Issue: Whether §230 of the Communications Decency Act, the First Amendment, and X Corp.'s contractual Terms of Service bar a court order compelling X Corp. to reinstate a suspended user account and cease processing third-party DMCA takedown notices during a pending appeal.

Plaintiff-Appellant Justin Riddle, proceeding pro se, originally sued X Corp. in the Western District of Texas alleging DMCA violations, contributory copyright infringement, and various other claims arising from third-party impersonation accounts and alleged account mismanagement; the district court dismissed the case with prejudice in September 2025 after finding Riddle engaged in persistent litigation misconduct, including harassing court staff and opposing counsel. Riddle then filed an emergency motion in the Fifth Circuit seeking injunctive relief pending appeal, including account reinstatement within 24 hours and an order directing X Corp. to cease processing DMCA notices filed by a non-party. X Corp. opposed the motion on both procedural grounds—arguing Riddle failed to first seek relief in the district court as required by Fed. R. App. P. 8, failed to comply with Fifth Circuit Local Rule 27.3's certification and notice requirements, and exceeded the word limit under Fed. R. App. P. 27—and on the merits, arguing Riddle could not demonstrate likelihood of success because the alleged account suspension and third-party takedown notices occurred entirely post-dismissal and were never before the district court, and that in any event §230, the First Amendment, and X Corp.'s Terms of Service independently barred the requested relief.

The opposition brief signals that §230 and the First Amendment jointly operate as a defense against court-ordered compelled reinstatement of suspended accounts, a position that, if adopted by the Fifth Circuit, would reinforce platform discretion over content moderation decisions even in the context of pending litigation; the brief also illustrates how procedural mechanisms—Rule 8 exhaustion requirements and local emergency motion rules—may serve as threshold barriers preventing appellate courts from reaching the merits of platform-liability disputes.

Issue: Whether a platform's simultaneous invocation of Section 230 immunity (asserting it is "not the speaker") and First Amendment editorial-discretion protection (asserting its content-moderation decisions constitute protected expressive choices) for identical conduct are mutually exclusive defenses that, when combined, negate the "good faith" requirement of § 230(c)(2).

Pro se appellant Justin Riddle brought claims in the Western District of Texas against X Corp. arising from an alleged 800-day impersonation campaign, repeated unsuccessful DMCA takedown notices, and alleged advertising fraud, along with ADA and copyright claims. The district court dismissed all claims with prejudice on October 27, 2025, citing, among other grounds, the appellant's "tone," declaring pending spoliation motions moot because the alleged evidence destruction had already occurred, and declining to address several emergency motions that had been pending for months. Riddle appeals, seeking reversal on seven grounds: that § 230 immunity and First Amendment editorial-discretion protection are logically mutually exclusive; that the spoliation-mootness ruling renders FRCP 37(e) unenforceable; that the district court created a logical impossibility by sustaining a contributory-infringement claim while dismissing the predicate direct-infringement claim; that the "passive conduit" defense is negated by X Corp.'s demonstrated capacity to remove access instantly; that X Corp.'s sworn answer asserting ignorance of its own systems contradicts its motion-to-dismiss briefing in violation of Rule 11 and judicial estoppel; and that the district court violated the ADA by ignoring accommodation requests and then penalizing the appellant's disability-related responses.

The brief squarely presents — as an opening brief, without a ruling on the merits — the unresolved question of whether a platform may simultaneously claim § 230's "not-the-speaker" immunity and First Amendment editorial-discretion protection for the same content-moderation act, a tension left open after *Moody v. NetChoice*; a Fifth Circuit ruling on that question would create binding precedent directly governing how platforms plead immunity in content-moderation litigation across the circuit.

Issue: Whether X Corp's simultaneous invocation of §230(c)(1) publisher immunity ("we are not the speaker") and First Amendment editorial-discretion protection ("our content moderation decisions are protected speech") for identical conduct are mutually exclusive theories that, taken together, defeat both defenses—and whether the district court further erred by dismissing a direct copyright infringement claim with prejudice while leaving intact a contributory copyright infringement claim dependent on it.

Pro se appellant Justin Riddle appeals a Western District of Texas dismissal with prejudice entered October 27, 2025 by Judge Alan D. Albright, asserting claims arising from X Corp's alleged 800-day failure to remove an impersonating account using Riddle's federally registered copyrighted photograph (VAu 1-519-728), approximately $1,060 in alleged advertising fraud, and systematic destruction of employee-account evidence. Riddle argues the district court created a logical impossibility by finding contributory copyright infringement plausibly alleged on July 11, 2025 while simultaneously dismissing the predicate direct infringement claim with prejudice. He further argues the district court erred by declaring two spoliation motions—filed six and ten days before the October 27 ruling—"moot" on the ground that evidence destruction was already complete, a rationale Riddle contends would render Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e) unenforceable in every case. Riddle also contends that X Corp's sworn Answer containing 47 denials of knowledge about its own operations, filed after its Motion to Dismiss demonstrated comprehensive operational knowledge of those same systems, violates Rule 11 and constitutes judicial estoppel, and that the district court violated the ADA by ignoring his documented ADHD accommodation request and then citing his responsive conduct as "tone" justifying dismissal.

If the Fifth Circuit addresses the merits, its ruling on whether §230(c)(1) immunity and First Amendment editorial-discretion protection can be invoked simultaneously for identical content-moderation conduct would create binding circuit precedent directly relevant to platform liability frameworks left open after *Moody v. NetChoice*, 603 U.S. 707 (2024); the court's treatment of the spoliation-mootness question could likewise determine whether Rule 37(e) has any practical force against defendants who complete evidence destruction before a ruling issues.