Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC v. Paxton

Issue: Whether the preliminary injunction enjoining the Texas Attorney General from "taking any action to enforce S.B. 2337" against Glass Lewis also bars enforcement of a Civil Investigative Demand issued under § 17.61 of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act, a separate pre-existing consumer-protection statute.

Glass Lewis filed suit on July 24, 2025, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on grounds that S.B. 2337—a Texas law regulating proxy advisory services—violates the First Amendment and is unconstitutionally vague; the court granted a preliminary injunction on August 29, 2025, enjoining the Attorney General from "taking any action to enforce S.B. 2337." Three days before the injunction issued, the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division had separately served Glass Lewis with a CID pursuant to DTPA § 17.61, investigating potential false, misleading, or deceptive trade practices. Glass Lewis refused to comply with the CID, asserting it fell within the injunction's scope, and threatened contempt proceedings; the Attorney General filed this Motion for Clarification on March 16, 2026, arguing that the CID is an exercise of independent DTPA authority wholly distinct from S.B. 2337 and therefore not covered by the injunction's plain language.

The motion tests the boundary between a targeted First Amendment injunction against a specific statute and a government agency's parallel investigative authority under a separate, long-standing consumer-protection law, with implications for how narrowly courts will construe injunctions restraining state enforcement actions against speakers such as proxy advisors.